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In re E.G.: The Right of Mature Minors in
Illinois to Refuse Lifesaving Medical
Treatment
I.

INTRODUCTION

Until the early part of the twentieth century, children in
America were regarded as mere chattels of their parents, occupying essentially the same social status as servants.' As a result of
social reforms throughout this century, children now are guaranteed many of the same constitutional rights enjoyed by adults. Despite these relatively recently acquired rights, minors are still
considered less able than adults to exercise mature, rational judgment, and often are prevented from making decisions that courts
and legislatures feel may adversely affect their well-being. To this
end, states have sharply restricted the ability of minors to exercise
autonomy in medical decision-making, including their ability to
consent to or refuse medical treatment.
In a case that vastly altered the state's ability to prevent minors
from controlling their own health care, the Illinois Supreme Court
decided that a seventeen-year-old Jehovah's Witness could refuse
lifesaving blood transfusions.2 The court previously had decided
cases in which adults had refused such transfusions for religious
reasons 3 and cases in which parents had refused such transfusions
on behalf of infants.4 In re E.G. involved a minor who was herself
refusing the transfusions on religious grounds; therefore, In re E.G.
presented a case of first impression in Illinois.
In February 1987, the juvenile court declared E.G. a neglected
minor, and appointed a guardian with the authority to consent to
blood transfusions on E.G.'s behalf. On review, however, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that because E.G. had made a
mature, independent decision to refuse the transfusions, the state
had no further interest in protecting her.' Pursuant to the Illinois.
1. Katz, Schroeder, & Sidman, EmancipatingOur Children- Coming of Legal Age in
America, 7 FAM. L. Q. 211, 212 (1973) [hereinafter Emancipating Our Children].
2. In re E.G., 133 I11. 2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989).
3. In Re Brooks' Estate, 32 I11. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). See infra notes 51-59
and accompanying text.
4. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952). See infra
notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
5. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d 765, 771, 515 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1st Dist. 1987).
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Emancipation of Mature Minors Act,6 the appellate court declared
E.G. emancipated for the limited purpose of consenting to or refusing blood transfusions.' The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this
portion of the appellate court's decision, stating that as a mature
minor, E.G. had a common law right to refuse medical treatment.'
This Note will examine the cases illustrating the conflict between
the state's interest in protecting minors9 and the rights of minors to
control their own health care. 10 The historical posture of Illinois
courts in allowing individuals to refuse lifesaving medical treatment also will be explored." The Note will then analyze the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re E. G. 12 Finally, the effect of
the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling on a minor's right to refuse
3
lifesaving medical treatment will be discussed.'
II.

BACKGROUND

In the exercise of their powers to promote community welfare,
states have broad authority to regulate the activities of their citizens."' One aspect of this police power is the parens patriae5
power, under which the state may act to protect those who are
legally incompetent. Minors, for example, traditionally are considered legally incompetent because of their inexperience and immaturity;16 a state, therefore, may exercise its parenspatriae authority
to limit the minor's ability to make legal decisions. ' The state's
parenspatriaeauthority over the minor fades as the minor becomes
more mature, and eventually disappears when the minor attains
legal majority.' 8 Recognizing that the maturity of some minors
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
of the

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2201-2211 (1987).

E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 772, 515 N.E.2d at 291.
E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 111-22, 549 N.E.2d at 327-28.
See infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 51-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 128-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 191-245 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Literally "parents of the country," parenspatriae traditionally refers to the role
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 579 (Abr. 5th ed. 1983).
16. See generally Dodson, Legal Rights of Adolescents: Restrictions on Liberty,
Emancipation and Status Offenses, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN §§ 4.01-.35 (R.
Horowitz & H. Davidson eds. 1984)(for a discussion of the relationship between the law
and minors).
17. Id. §§ 4.02 -.03.
18. Id. § 4.01. In addition to allowing the state a measure of authority over minors,
the state's parenspatriae authority encompasses all legally incompetent persons, including temporarily and permanently disabled adults, and the mentally retarded. Although
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renders the exercise of the parenspatriaeauthority inappropriate in
certain situations, most states have adopted some form of the mature minor doctrine, which recognizes that a minor who can
demonstrate maturity should be allowed to make certain legal decisions independently.' 9
The controversy presented by In re E.G. involved balancing the
state's parens patriae interest against the rights of the mature minor to bodily self-determination,2 ° including the right to exercise
religious beliefs. 2' Although courts previously had balanced these

similar interests in the context of abortion rights,22 neither the
United States Supreme Court nor any other state high court23 has
been asked to determine whether a minor has a right to refuse lifesaving treatment on religious grounds. 24 The arguments presented
by the litigants in In re E.G. consequently rested on three lines of
cases: cases dealing with the state's parenspatriaeinterests; 2 cases
this authority obviously is quite broad, it stops short of allowing governmental interference into the private decisions of competent adults. See generally Byrn, Compulsory
Lifesaving Treatmentfor the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Compulsory Treatment].
19. See, e.g., Illinois Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
paras. 2201-2211 (1987); Illinois Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 11, paras. 4501-4505 (1987).
20. Bodily self-determination describes the right of the competent individual to exercise exclusive control over her own body and generally is considered to include the right
to consent to or refuse medical treatment. See infra notes 43-77 and accompanying text
(discussing bodily self-determination).
21. See infra notes 35-42, 51-59 and accompanying text (cases discussing interplay of
medical treatment and religious beliefs).
22. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (invalidating abortion parental
consent statute that made no alternative provision for mature minors); Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating state statute requiring minors to obtain parental consent before seeking abortion). See infra notes
92-98 and accompanying text (Bellotti discussed), notes 84-91 and accompanying text
(PlannedParenthooddiscussed).
23. A California trial court refused to compel a fourteen-year-old Jehovah's Witness
to accept treatment involving blood transfusions that were prohibited by the religious
beliefs of both the minor and her parents. Unlike E.G., the minor in that case did not
require the transfusions to save her life, and alternative, although less successful, treatment options were available to her. In re D.P., No. 91590 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County, July 1986).
24. A number of states have compelled minors to undergo lifesaving treatment over
parental opposition. The minors in these cases were younger than E.G., and it was the
parents, not the minors themselves, who refused treatment. See In re Eric B., 189 Cal.
App. 3d 996, 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1987) (six-year-old boy); In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271
(Colo. 1982) (16-year-old girl); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053
(1978) (two-year-old girl); In re Ivey, 319 So.2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (four-dayold infant); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (12-day-old infant).
25. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952). See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying
text (Labrenz discussion).
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dealing with the right to bodily self-determination;2 6 and cases
dealing with 27
the mature minor doctrine in the context of constitutional rights.

A.

The State's ParensPatriaeInterest

The first and fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution
guarantee parents the right to raise their children without undue
governmental interference. 28 A state, however, legitimately may
exercise its parens patriae authority to restrict parental rights in
order to safeguard the health and welfare of children.29 One of the
earliest cases in which the United States Supreme Court was required to balance the state's parens patriae interest against the
rights of parents to follow their religious beliefs in raising their
children was Prince v. Massachusetts.30 In Prince, the appellant
was convicted of directing her ward, a minor, to sell Jehovah's
Witnesses' publications on the streets, thereby violating a statute
prohibiting children from selling literature in public places . 3a The
appellant claimed that the statute unconstitutionally infringed
upon her right to practice her religious beliefs in raising her ward.
The Court upheld the statute, declaring that the state, as parens
patriae, had the power to limit parental freedom and authority in
matters affecting the welfare of children.32 In what has become an
often-quoted passage in support of a state's ability to intervene into
the familial relationship, the Court stated, "Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when
26. See, e.g., In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill.
2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). See infra
notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976). See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
28. For example, parents have the right to follow their religious and moral beliefs in
educating their children. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking
down a state statute requiring Amish parents to send their children to public schools);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a state statute requiring
children to attend public rather than private or parochial schools); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state statute prohibiting the teaching of German in
public schools).
29. See generally 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parentand Child § 11 (1987).
30. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
31. Id. at 159, 161. Child labor statutes such as the one in Prince represented one of
the first state forays into parental control over children. See generally R. MNOOKIN & D.
WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY & STATE 824 (2d ed. 1989) (for a historical view of child
labor laws).
32. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168-69.

1990]

The Right of Minors to Refuse Medical Treatment

1203

they can make that choice for themselves. ' 33 The Court held that,
because a state has broader authority over children than over
adults, the state did not exceed its power when it prohibited a child
from selling religious tracts in public places, even though it could
not have prevented an adult from doing the same.34
Following the rationale in Prince, the Illinois Supreme Court in
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz35 held that the parents of an infant could not refuse blood transfusions required to save the infant's life. 36 In Labrenz, the infant daughter of two Jehovah's
Witnesses was born with a blood disorder which, if left untreated,
would result in the infant's death or severe mental impairment.
The only known treatment involved blood transfusions that the
parents refused as against their religious beliefs.3 7 Pursuant to the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 3s the trial court declared the infant neglected, and appointed a guardian to consent to the transfusions.39
Because the transfusions involved little risk and were virtually
always successful, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the parents'
argument that they had merely exercised their right to avoid a haz33. Id. at 170.
34. Id. at 167-68, 170.
35. 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
36. Id. at 625-26, 104 N.E.2d at 773-74.
37. Id. at 620-21, 104 N.E.2d at 771. The Jehovah's Witnesses were founded in the
United States in 1872 by Charles Taze Russell. See generally 6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 524 (15th ed. 1986). A millennalistic sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses
separate themselves from other denominations and secular governments. They seek to
establish God's Kingdom on earth following Armageddon and believe that our destiny
will unfold according to a timetable set out in the apocalyptic books of the Bible. Id. at
524-25. Jehovah's Witnesses donate many hours to door-to-door preaching and distribution of literature, including books, tracts, and two widely disseminated magazines,
Watchtower and Awake. The sect views blood transfusions as a violation of the Biblical
prohibitions against eating blood ("For it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us to
lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things: that you abstain from what
has been sacrificed to idols and from blood ....
" Acts 15:28-29. Reliance also is placed
on Leviticus 17:10, Genesis 9:3-4, and Deuteronomy 12:33. WATCH TOWER BIBLE &
TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA,

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND THE QUESTION OF

BLOOD (1977).

See generally Milhollin, The Refused Blood Transfusion: An Ultimate
Challengefor Law and Morals 10 NAT. L. F. (1965). Other religious sects that rely on
prayer instead of medical technology for healing include Christian Scientists, see In re
Eric B., 189 Cal. App. 3d 996, 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1st Dist. 1987); The General Assembly
and Church of the First Born, see In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982); and The
Church of God of the United Assembly, see In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1983).

38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 802-1 to 803-32 (1987). The Illinois Juvenile
Court Act defines a neglected minor as "any minor under 18 years of age whose parent
does not provide the proper... medical or other remedial rare... necessary for a
minor's well-being." Id. para. 802-3 (1987).
39. Labrenz, 411 Ill. at 621-22, 104 N.E.2d at 772.
...
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ardous procedure." The court then considered the parents' argument that the trial court's application of the Juvenile Court Act
deprived them of their right to exercise their religious beliefs in
making medical decisions for their daughter. Quoting Prince, the
court stated "'neither the rights of religion [n]or the rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation.' "41 The Labrenz court recognized that the danger to the infant in the case before it presented a
far stronger case for state intervention than did the situation in
Prince, and it held that the state's interest in preserving the lives of
minors outweighed parents' rights to exercise their religious
42
beliefs.
B.

The Right to Bodily Self-Determination

The concept of bodily self-determination rests on the theory that
a competent adult has the right to absolute control over her own
body. 3 As Justice Cardozo stated: "No right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.""
At common law, a competent adult has complete autonomy over
her own body, including the right to consent to or refuse medical
treatment. 5 In order to effectively consent to medical treatment,
an individual must be informed of the potential benefits of the
treatment, along with any attendant risks. 46 A physician or other
health care provider who performs a procedure against the patient's will or for which the patient has not consented has committed an "unauthorized touching," and may be liable for battery. 7
Another source of the right to bodily self-determination is the
constitutional right to privacy. For example, the right to privacy
affords the individual a measure of reproductive autonomy, including the ability to decide "whether to bear or beget a child."48 The
40. Id. at 624-25, 104 N.E.2d at 773.
41. Id. at 625, 104 N.E.2d at 773-74 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166).
42. Id. at 626, 104 N.E.2d at 774.
43. Cantor & Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 546 (1985) [hereinafter Best Interests] (citing In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 346-48, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222-23 (1985).
44. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
45. Best Interests, supra note 43, at 546.
46. Id.
47. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (5th ed. 1984)
(for a discussion of the tort doctrine of informed consent and battery).
48. Eisenstat v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
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common law right to bodily self-determination and the constitutional right to privacy arguably guarantee a competent adult the
right to refuse even lifesaving medical treatment. In a so-called
"right-to-die" case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,49 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that individuals have a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,
but in the case of an incompetent, the state may require clear and
convincing evidence that withdrawal of treatment is desired.5°
Prior to the Cruzan decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the United States Constitution guarantees an individual the
right to make medical decisions free from undue interference by
the state. In 1965, the court held in In re Brooks' Estate5 1 that an
adult has a right to follow her religious beliefs when making medical decisions, even when those beliefs dictate the refusal of lifesaving treatment.52 The appellant in Brooks was an adult Jehovah's
Witness who repeatedly had told her physician that her religious
convictions prohibited her from accepting blood transfusions.
Nevertheless, when her condition required such a transfusion, her
physician successfully petitioned the court for an order appointing
a conservator to consent to the transfusion.5
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the first5 4 and fourteenth55
153 (1973) ("This right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."). The constitutional right to privacy first
was given form in a law journal article by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. See
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). The most famous exposition of the right may be found in Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) in which he
described the right to have one's private life protected from government interference as
"the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man."
49. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). Nancy Cruzan was a thirty-year-old patient in a persistent vegetative state who required artificial nutrition and hydration. Her parents sought
to have the nutrition and hydration discontinued, citing their daughter's previously expressed desire not to be kept alive in such a state. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 418. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "[b]ut for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 2852. In a
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that "the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision
to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water." Id. at
2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
50. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
51. 32 Ill.
2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
52. Id. at 373-74, 205 N.E.2d at 442-43.
53. Id. at 363-64, 205 N.E.2d at 437.
54. The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
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amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit a state
from interfering with an individual's absolute right to exercise her
religious beliefs, except when that exercise presents a clear and
present danger to the "public health, welfare, or morals. ' 56 In
finding that no such clear and present danger existed, the Brooks
court stated:
Even though we may consider appellant's beliefs unwise, foolish
or ridiculous, in the absence of an overriding danger to society
we may not permit interference therewith... [by] compelling her
to accept medical treatment forbidden by her religious principles,
and previously refused by her with full knowledge of the probable consequences. In the final analysis, what has happened here
involves a judicial attempt to decide what course of action is best
for a particular individual, notwithstanding that individual's contrary views based upon religious convictions.
Such action cannot
57
be constitutionally countenanced.
The Brooks court held that the state had no legitimate interest in
interfering in the appellant's medical decisions. The court distinguished Brooks from cases such as Labrenz, in which the exercise
of religious beliefs endangered the health of minors.58 The court
further noted that Brooks did not have minor children who would
become wards of the state if she died, nor was she pregnant with a
child who would be injured as a result of her decision.5 9 Thus, the
court left unresovled whether an adult would be free to exercise her
religious beliefs in a manner that would seriously affect a minor's
welfare.
Twenty-four years after Brooks, the Illinois Supreme Court
again considered the right to bodily self-determination in In re Esrespecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
CONST.

" U.S.

amend. I.

55. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "no state shall
make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States .... "U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d at 372, 205 N.E.2d at 441.
57. Id. at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
58. Id. at 369, 205 N.E.2d at 439 (citing People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1959)). See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text) (Labrenz
discussed).
59. Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d at 369, 205 N.E.2d at 440. The court noted that if the children
became wards of the state, "[tihe State might well have an overriding interest in the
welfare of the mother .... " Id. For example, in Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, No. 89:
E0024-G1, slip. op. (Mass. Trial Court, Probate and Family Court Dept., May 11, 1989),
the court issued a declaratory judgment in favor of a hospital that sought to be absolved
of liability if it complied with the wishes of a Jehovah's Witness who was refusing lifesaving blood transfusions. The basis of the court's decision was the hardship the patient's
death would cause to her five-year-old son.
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tate of Longeway.6° In Longeway, the court held that the guardian
of an incompetent patient may refuse artificial nutrition and hydration on the patient's behalf.6 1 Longeway, a seventy-six year old
woman, had suffered severe brain damage resulting from a series of
strokes. Although not clinically brain dead, Longeway's neurological damage was so severe that she would never regain consciousness. Because Longeway had lost the ability to chew and swallow,
she required nutrition through a tube surgically implanted into her
stomach.6 2
Longeway's daughter brought suit as her guardian to compel
withdrawal of the feeding tube. The daughter alleged that,
although Longeway had not executed a living will 63 or signed a

health care power of attorney,"M she had indicated while still conscious and competent that she did not wish to be kept alive by
artificial means. 65 Lacking guidance from the United States
Supreme Court, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to address
whether the constitutional right to privacy included the right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 66 Instead, the court
looked to common law that requires a physician to obtain the patient's consent before initiating any medical treatment. 67 Finding
that the requirement of consent necessarily implied a right to re60. 133 Il. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
61. Id. at 45-46, 549 N.E.2d at 297-98.
62. Id. at 36, 549 N.E.2d at 293.
63. The Living Will Act represents a legislative finding that individuals have the
"fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical
care, including the decision to have death delaying procedures withheld or withdrawn in
instances of a terminal condition." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701 (1987). The
Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]n individual of sound mind and having reached
the age of majority or having obtained the status of an emancipated person pursuant to
the 'Emancipation of Mature Minors Act' .. . may execute a document directing that if
he is suffering from a terminal condition, then death delaying procedures shall not be
utilized for the prolongation of his life." Id. para. 703.
64. The Illinois Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law states: "The General Assembly recognizes the right of the individual to control all aspects of his or her personal
care and medical treatment, including the right to decline medical treatment or to direct
that it be withdrawn, even if death ensues." Id. para. 804-1. Executing a health care
power of attorney allows the individual to delegate to an agent the power to make medical decisions for the individual should the individual become unable to make them himself. Id.
65. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 36, 549 N.E.2d at 293.
66. Id. at 44, 549 N.E.2d at 297.
67. Id. at 44-45, 549 N.E.2d at 297 (citing Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250
(1891); Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E.92 (1914)). Ironically, the Supreme Court looked to
Longeway in deciding whether Nancy Cruzan had a right to discontinuation of hydration
and nutrition. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2850.
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fuse treatment, the court held that under Illinois common law, a
patient has the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration. 6 Further, when the patient is incompetent, the Illinois Probate Act 69 allows the patient's surrogate
to exercise this right under the substituted judgment theory.7 °
The court cautioned, however, that the individual's right to discontinue life-sustaining treatment must be balanced against the
state's interests in continuing the treatment, 7 1 including the preservation of life, the protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and maintaining the integrity of the medical
profession.72 The court conceded that none of these interests
would normally override the patient's right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration.73
Although the Longeway court cited Brooks74 as authority for the
Illinois common law right to refuse medical treatment,75 the
Brooks decision rested on the court's holding that Brooks' motive
for refusing the treatment was protected by the constitution's guarantee of religious freedom. 6 The Longeway opinion, however,
gave no indication that Longeway's wishes were motivated by her
religious beliefs. Longeway therefore, extends Brooks by not re68. Id. at 45, 549 N.E.2d at 297.
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. I la-17 (1987). Section I la-17 of the Probate
Act provides that the guardian shall make provisions for the support, care, comfort, and
health of his ward. Id.
70. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 48-49, 549 N.E.2d at 298-99. The substituted judgment
theory requires that the guardian or other surrogate decisionmaker substitute her judgment for what she believes the patient would choose under the circumstances. In determining the patient's wishes, the surrogate considers any of the patient's previously
expressed opinions regarding the proposed medical treatment, the patient's religious and
philosophical beliefs, and the patient's attitudes towards illness, suffering and death. Id.
at 49-50, 549 N.E.2d at 299. The court concluded that the Illinois legislature implicitly
had adopted the substituted judgment theory in the Powers of Attorney for Health Care
Law, which provides that an agent has the authority to terminate any type of medical
care on behalf of the patient, so long as the agent believes such action would be consistent
with the intent and desires of the patient. Id. at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 299. See supra note
64.
71. 133 Ill. 2d at 48, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
72. Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977)).
73. Id. "Adequate safeguards exist to protect life and third parties, and to prevent
suicide. Moreover, the ethical integrity of the medical profession can be ensured by not
compelling . . . any medical facility or its staff to act contrary to their moral principles."
Id. But see In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 369, 205 N.E.2d 435, 440 (1965) (state
may have an overriding interest in the life and health of a parent whose children are in
danger of becoming wards of the state).
74. Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435.
75. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 44-45, 549 N.E.2d at 297.
76. Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d at 372-73, 205 N.E.2d at 441-42.
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quiring the motive for refusing medical treatment to be based on
constitutionally protected religious beliefs. A person's motives for
refusing treatment nevertheless remain relevant because the court's
adoption of a balancing test suggests that, at some point, the state's
interests in preserving life and preventing suicide could outweigh
the individual's right to control medical treatment."
C.

The Mature Minor Doctrine and The Minor's Right to
ConstitutionalProtection

Traditionally, the common law views minors as suffering from a
type of mental incompetence, giving rise to a presumption of legal
incapacity. 78 This presumption of incapacity arises from the perceived need to protect minors from the consequences of their immature actions and decisions. 79 For example, in many states, very
young minors may be presumed unable to formulate intent required to commit an intentional tort. °
Similarly, in criminal law, young children traditionally have
been thought unable to formulate the mens rea necessary to be convicted of a crime. 8 ' Even ancient English law, however, allowed a

child to be prosecuted as an adult when the evidence indicated that
the child had acted with criminal intent.82 Most modem criminal
codes likewise attribute to minors at least some degree of presumed
incapacity to formulate criminal intent, while still providing that a
77. Courts and commentators disagree as to whether the states's interest in preventing suicide is implicated in cases involving the right to refuse lifesaving or life-sustaining
medical treatment. Compare Best Interests, supra note 43, at 549 (so long as the fatal
medical condition is not self-induced, refusing life-sustaining medical treatment is outside
the legal definition of suicide) with John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J.
576, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (1971) (state's interest in compelling lifesaving treatment in some
such circumstances is essentially equivalent to its interest in preventing suicide).
78. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
about Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 613 (1976).
79. Id.
80. Horowitz & Hunter, The Child Litigant, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 3.06
(R. Horowitz & H. Davidson eds. 1984). Most jurisdictions have no fixed age limits for
findings of tortious intent. Id. Some states, however, follow the "Rule of Sevens" that
conclusively presumes a child under age seven incapable of forming tortious intent. Between the ages of seven and fourteen, there is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity, and
between the ages of fourteen and eighteen there is a rebuttable presumption of capacity.
See, e.g., Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987).
8 1. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.11 (2d ed. 1986). The criminal law
generally follows the "Rule of Sevens" for purposes of presumptions relating to capacity.
Id. § 4.11, at 398.
82. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23-24 (1st
ed. facsimile 1769, available through University of Chicago Press 1979) (ten year-old boy
exhibited discretion between good and evil by hiding his slain playmate's body).
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minor exhibiting criminal intent may be prosecuted as an adult.8 3
Although the presumption of incapacity remains a viable legal
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
some minors possess the maturity to make certain constitutionally
protected decisions. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth," the
Court considered the constitutionality of a Missouri statute requiring that every minor obtain parental consent prior to seeking an
abortion. 5 Although Roe v. Wade 6 guaranteed a woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy during its first trimester,
Missouri argued that allowing a minor to obtain an abortion without the advice and guidance of a caring, responsible adult would
violate the state's duty to protect the welfare of minors.87
The Planned Parenthood Court held that minors, like adults,
were entitled to constitutional rights, including the right to seek an
abortion.88 Therefore, in order to restrict a minor's right to an
abortion by granting the parent absolute veto power over the minor's decision, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest,
unnecessary in the case of an adult.8 9 The Court ruled that the
state's interest in safeguarding family unity and parental authority
was not sufficiently compelling and held the statute unconstitutional. 9° Yet, the Court emphasized that its holding did not mean
83. W. LAFAVE, supra note 81, § 4.11, at 400. See, e.g., Illinois Juvenile Court Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 801-1 to 807-1 (1987). Section 5-4 of the Illinois Juvenile
Court Act provides that except where otherwise provided, minors under seventeen may
be prosecuted as delinquent minors, but not as adults under Illinois criminal laws. Id.
para. 805-4. Yet, section 5-4(6)(a) provides that a minor fifteen or older charged with
first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, armed robbery when the robbery
is committed with a firearm, or unlawful use of weapons shall be prosecuted as an adult
under Illinois criminal laws. Id para. 805-4(6)(a).
84. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
85. Id. at 72.
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. Planned Parenthood,428 U.S. at 72-73.
88. Id at 74. The Court stated that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the constitution and possess constitutional rights." Id.
89. Id at 74-75. In a previous portion of the opinion, the Court had considered
another provision of the Missouri statute that required a married woman to obtain her
husband's consent prior to undergoing an abortion, unless the abortion was required to
save the woman's life. Id. at 67-68. In striking down this provision, the Court held that
"the state cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power that the state itself is absolutely and
totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.' " Id. at 69
(quoting Danforth v. Planned Parenthood, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375) (E.D. Mo. 1975)
(Webster, J., dissenting)).
90. Id. at 75. Although the Court did not suggest any state interests that would be
compelling, it did state that "[a]ny independent interest theparent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of
the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant." Id. (emphasis added).
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that every minor, regardless of her age and level of maturity, could
effectively consent to an abortion. 91
In Bellotti v. Baird,92 the Court struck down a similar state statute as unconstitutionally restricting a minor's right to obtain an
abortion. The court conceded that although the Constitution protects minors as well as adults, minors' constitutional rights cannot
be equated with those of adults. 93 The peculiar vulnerability of
children, their frequent inability to make important decisions maturely, and the importance of the role of parents in childrearing,
mandated flexibility in applying constitutional principles to
children. 94
Because a state legitimately may limit the freedom of minors to
make certain serious decisions,9" the state had not overstepped its
bounds by requiring minors to consult their parents before making
the critical decision to terminate a pregnancy. 96 The Court nevertheless held the statute unconstitutional because it provided no alternative for a minor who could demonstrate the requisite maturity
to make such a decision without parental guidance. 97 As in
PlannedParenthood,the statute necessarily failed because it impermissibly granted the parent absolute veto power over the minor's
right to an abortion. 9
III.
A.

DISCUSSION

FactualBackground of In re E.G.

In February 1987, E.G., a seventeen-year-old Jehovah's Witness,
was diagnosed as having acute nonlymphocytic leukemia, a malignant disease affecting white blood cells. 99 Treatment of the disease
required blood transfusions, which E.G. and her mother refused as
91. Id. The Court did not describe circumstances that would justify a state's restriction of a minor's ability to consent to abortion. This cautionary statement appears to
permit a state to require parental consent for minors seeking abortions, so long as the
state allows a minor who can demonstrate her maturity some means by which she can
circumvent the parental consent requirements. Id. at 90-91 (Stewart, J. concurring).
92. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
93. Id. at 634.
94. Id.
95. For example, a state may legitimately consider a minor's immaturity in restricting the right to vote or to marry. Id. at 635-36 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in result)).
96. Id. at 641.
97. Id. at 643.
98. Id.
99. In re E.G., 133 Ill. 2d 98, 101, 549 N.E.2d 322, 323 (1989).
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against their religious beliefs. 0 Because E.G.'s physician believed
that E.G. would die within a few weeks if she did not receive the
transfusions, the state instituted neglect proceedings against E.G.'s
mother in juvenile court. 0 1
E.G.'s physician testified at an initial hearing that E.G.'s blood
had only one-fifth to one-sixth normal oxygen-carrying capacity.
Because any exertion left E.G. excessively fatigued and occasionally incoherent, she was confined to bedrest. 0 2 The physician
noted E.G.'s maturity and religious sincerity and further testified
that E.G. apparently understood her treatment options and the
consequences of refusing the transfusions. 0 3 The hospital's associate general counsel agreed with the physician's assessment of
E.G.'s maturity and competence."° Nevertheless, the trial judge
appointed the associate general counsel temporary guardian with
authority to consent to transfusions on E.G.'s behalf.0 0 E.G. subsequently received nine to ten transfusions over a two-month
period. 1o
In April 1987, the trial court held further hearings regarding
E.G.'s welfare. 0 After receiving several blood transfusions, E.G.
was strong enough to testify on her own behalf.'08 She testified
that she understood the nature of her disease and the consequences
of refusing the transfusions. 09 She further stated that, although
she did not wish to die, her religious beliefs prohibited her from
accepting blood transfusions. " 0
A psychiatrist who specialized in evaluating the maturity and
competency of minors was among other witnesses testifying to
E.G.'s maturity at the second hearing."' After evaluating E.G.,
the psychiatrist concluded that E.G. had the maturity level of an
100. Id. at 101-02, 549 N.E.2d at 323. E.G. and her mother did consent to any other
treatment. Id. For a discussion of the basis of Jehovah's Witnesses' refusal to consent to
blood transfusions, see supra note 37.
101. 133 I11.2d at 102, 549 N.E.2d at 323. For the relevant portion of the Juvenile
Court Act, see supra note 38.
102. In re E.G., 161 I11. App. 3d 765, 780, 515 N.E.2d 286, 297 (1st Dist. 1987)
(McNamara, J., dissenting).
103. 133 Ill. 2d at 102, 549 N.E.2d at 323.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 102, 549 N.E.2d at 323-24.
106. E.G., 161 I11.App. 3d 765, 781, 515 N.E.2d 286, 297 (1st Dist. 1987) (McNamara, J., dissenting).
107. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 103, 549 N.E.2d at 324.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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eighteen to twenty-one year-old and was competent to refuse the
transfusions." 2 After the second hearing, the trial court declared
E.G. medically neglected and appointed a permanent guardian to
13
consent to further medical treatment on E.G.'s behalf."
Although the trial court found that E.G. was a mature seventeen
year-old who had reached her decision on an independent basis,
the court also reasoned that it was in E.G.'s best interest to remain
under the care of a court-appointed guardian." 4 In addition, the
court held that the state's interest in preserving E.G.'s life outweighed the interests of E.G. and her mother in exercising their
religious beliefs. II5
B.

The Appellate Court's Decision

The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the
trial court's finding that E.G. was medically neglected" 6 but vacated the trial court's order appointing a guardian for E.G."I7 The
court noted that in Brooks, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
first amendment right of an adult Jehovah's Witness to refuse
blood transfusions." 8 The court then extended this constitutional
right to mature minors, relying on the United States Supreme
Court decisions in Planned Parenthood'19 and Bellotti, 20 which
held that a state could not restrict the constitutional rights of mature minors to obtain abortions. 21
The court conceded that the
Supreme Court had not yet extended the privacy rights of minors
beyond reproductive matters but reasoned that such an extension
was inevitable. 22 Recognizing the historical importance of religious freedom in the United States, the court stated "[w]e find it
difficult to consider seriously an argument that such freedom
should be afforded less protection from government infringement
than the rights at issue in the abortion cases."' 23
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 103-04, 549 N.E.2d at 324.
116. E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 772, 515 N.E.2d at 291.
117. Id.at 771, 515 N.E.2d at 291.
118. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text
(Brooks discussed).
119. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (Planned
Parenthood discussed).
120. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. (Bellotti
discussed).
121. E.G., 161 Ill.
App. 3d at 770-71, 515 N.E.2d at 290.
122. Id. at 771, 515 N.E.2d at 290.
123. Id.
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The court held that because the trial court found E.G. to be a
mature seventeen year-old who had arrived at her decision without
parental influence, the state had no further interest in protecting
E.G. as an immature minor.1 24 The court then inquired whether
the state had advanced any other interest that would not be present
in the case of an adult. Ruling that the state had advanced no such
interest, the court held that E.G. could not be prevented from exercising her constitutional right solely on the basis of her being a
minor. 5 Pursuant to the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, 126
the court declared E.G. emancipated
for the purpose of consenting
127
to or refusing medical treatment.
C.

The Opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court as to
E.G.'s right to refuse transfusions 2 8 but reversed and remanded
the neglect finding. 129 Unlike the appellate court, however, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to reach the first amendment issues 3 "
and instead relied on the Illinois common law right to refuse medical treatment as articulated in Longeway. 3
1. The Mootness Issue
Although the issue in this case technically was moot because
E.G. was no longer a minor, both parties argued that the case
should not be dismissed. l3 2 Even though a court should not take
124. Id.
125. Id. at 771, 515 N.E.2d at 290-91.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2201-2211 (1987). The Act provides, in pertinent
part, "[a] mature minor ordered emancipated under this Act shall have the right to enter
into valid legal contracts, and shall have such other rights and responsibilities as the
court may order ...... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2205 (1987). Although Section
2207 of the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act requires a minor to demonstrate the
ability to manage her own affairs and to live wholly or partially independent of her parents or guardian, Section 2202 provides that the Act "does not limit or exclude any other
means either in statute or case law by which a minor may become emancipated." ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2202, 2207 (1987).
127. E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d at 771-72, 515 N.E.2d at 290-91.
128. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
129. Id. at 112-13, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
130. Id. at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
131. Id. at 109, 549 N.E.2d at 326 (citing Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 45-46, 549 N.E.2d
at 297-98). See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (discussion of the Illinois common law right to refuse medical treatment).
132. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 105, 549 N.E.2d at 325. A case is moot if "there is no subject
matter on which the judgment of the court's order can operate." Ex parte Baez, 117 U.S.
378, 390 (1900). See, e.g., Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922), in which a
father and son sued to enjoin a business from firing the son so that the business could
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an appeal if the matter is not "live," courts will make an exception
if there is "substantial public interest" in the subject matter of the
litigation. 33 In E. G., the court indicated that application of this
exception depended on "'the public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination
for the future guidance of public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.' "134 The court noted that in two
other cases in which Jehovah's Witnesses had refused blood transfusions, Brooks and Labrenz, it had concluded that significant public interest existed and decided the cases on the merits.13 Without
further discussion, the court stated that the present case met the
criteria for the public interest exception,
and that the court would
36
therefore address the case's merits.
2.

The Illinois Common Law Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment
In determining whether E.G.'s minority precluded her from refusing lifesaving medical treatment, the court noted that in Illinois,
adults have the right to refuse medical treatment, under both Illinois common law' 37 and the first amendment's guarantee of religious freedom. 38 The court also noted that in Illinois, a minor can
be compelled to accept lifesaving medical treatment over the religious objections of her parents. 139 Recognizing that the only bar to
E.G.'s ability to refuse blood transfusions was the six months separating her from her eighteenth birthday, the court then questioned
whether these six months prevented E.G. from exercising the right
to refuse medical treatment. 4°
comply with child labor laws. During the lapse of time between the time the matter was
brought and decided, the minor reached an age not subject to application by the statute in
question.
133. Id. at 105-06, 549 N.E.2d at 325. Justice Clark, however, dissented on the
mootness issue, finding that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine were implicated in this case. Id. at 115, 549 N.E.2d at 329 (Clark, J., dissenting). See infra notes
186-190 and accompanying text.
134. KG., 133 I11.
2d at 105, 549 N.E.2d at 325 (quoting People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 411 I11.
618, 622, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1952)).
135. Id. (citing In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 366-67, 205 N.E.2d 435, 437-38
(1965) and Labrenz, 411 111. at 622-23, 104 N.E.2d at 772).
136. Id. at 105-06, 549 N.E.2d at 325.
137. Id. at 106, 549 N.E.2d at 325 (citing Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 45, 549 N.E.2d at
297). See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (reference to this right).
138. Id. (citing Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 441-42). See supra notes 5159 and accompanying text (Brooks discussed).
139. Id. (citing Labrenz, 411 Ill.
at 626, 104 N.E.2d at 774). See supra notes 35-48
and accompanying text (Labenz discussed).
140. Id.
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Because E.G. was a minor under the legislative definition of
legal majority,14 1 the court first focused on whether the legislature
intended the age of eighteen to be an "impenetrable barrier that
magically precludes a minor from possessing and exercising certain
rights normally associated with adulthood."' 42 In determining
that the legislature did not so intend, the court examined three
statutes: the Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act,'43 the
Emancipation of Mature Minors Act,'" and the Juvenile Court
45
Act.
First, the Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act
removes one of the disabilities of minority by allowing certain minors to consent to medical treatment.' 46 Under this Act, any minor who is married or pregnant may effectively consent to medical
treatment. 147 Additionally, any minor over twelve may consent to
treatment for venereal disease or chemical addiction.' 4 As such,
the Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act represents an
apparent legislative determination that the importance of allowing
minors to seek medical care in such situations outweighs the inter141. The Emancipation of Mature Minors Act defines a minor as "a person 16 years
of age or over, and under the age of 18 years ....
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2203-1
(1987).
142. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 106, 549 N.E.2d at 325.
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 4501-4505 (1987).
144. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2201-2211 (1987).
145. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 802-1 to 803-32 (1987).
146. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 4501, 4502, 4504 (1987).
147. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 4501, 4502 (1987). The Act provides that for
purposes of consenting to medical treatment, "a married person who is a minor, a pregnant woman who is a minor, or any person 18 years of age or older, is deemed to have the
same legal capacity to act and has the same powers... as has a person of legal age." ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4501 (1987). Such provisions concerning married or pregnant
minors generally represent a legislative acknowledgment of the radical change in the minor's position within the family, especially in relation to her parents. See generally Katz,
supra note 1, at 217.
148. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4504 (1987). Section 4504 provides, in pertinent
part, "a minor 12 years of age or older who may have come into contact with any venereal disease, or may be determined to be an addict, an alcoholic or an intoxicated person
...may give consent to the furnishing of medical care or counseling related to the diagnosis or treatment of such disease." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 4504 (1987). Unlike
provisions concerning married and pregnant minors, provisions concerning minors who
suffer from venereal disease or chemical addiction are based more on the critical need to
allow minors free access to treatment for such conditions than on legislative determinations of family situations. Such statutes were passed in response to the increasing incidence of sexual activity and drug use among minors in the 1960s. Because minors
involved in these activities were reluctant to have their parents find out about them, the
minors frequently did not seek treatment for venereal disease and drug addiction. The
resulting individual and public health crisis prompted most states to pass laws enabling
minors to seek medical treatment for such afflictions. Katz, supra note 1, at 238-39.
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ests of either the parents or the state in preventing minors from
consenting to medical treatment. 149
Similarly, under the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, a minor may be declared emancipated with the legal authority to control her own health care decisions. 150 Under this Act, any minor
over sixteen who can demonstrate the ability to live partially or
wholly independent from her parents' 5 ' may seek a court order
granting either complete or partial emancipation. 5 2 However, the
Act provides that no order of emancipation shall be entered over
the objection of the minor's parents or guardian.' 53 The court held
that read together, the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act and
the Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act, indicated that
the legislature did not intend the age of eighteen to be an impenetrable barrier prohibiting minors from exercising rights normally
associated with adulthood, including the right to consent to medical treatment. 154

Finally, the court considered the Juvenile Court Act,15 5 that permits persons under eighteen to be prosecuted as adults in certain
circumstances. 6 The decision whether to prosecute a minor as an
adult turns on a determination of the minor's capacity to formulate
criminal intent.'

The court concluded that the Juvenile Court

Act presupposed a "sliding scale of maturity,"' 58 that demands
certain persons under eighteen receive the same treatment as
adults. 5 9 Thus, the legislative intent expressed in the Juvenile
Court Act focuses on the individual's mental capacities rather than
upon chronological age. 160

The court also cited cases in which the United States Supreme
149. Katz, supra note 1, at 239. Legislation allowing minors to consent to medical
treatment in these situations also encourages health care facilities to provide treatment to
minors by insulating the facility from liability for treating the minor without parental
consent. Id. This type of legislation also protects the facility from financial risk by ensuring that the minor's consent will not be subject to disaffirmance by reason of minority.
Id.
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2201-2211 (1987). See supra note 126, (text of
the pertinent provision).
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2203-2 (1987). See also supra note 126.
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2202 (1987).
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2209 (1987).
154. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 107, 549 N.E.2d at 325.
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 802-1 to 803-32 (1987).
156. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 107, 549 N.E.2d at 325-26. See W. LAFAVE § 4.11, supra
note 81, at 398.
157.
158.
159.
160.

E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 107, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 107, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
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Court had extended constitutional rights to minors, 6 ' including
the right to privacy,1 62 the right to seek an abortion, 63 freedom of
speech, 64 freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures,1 65 and
procedural due process.l 66 Although the court did not reach the
issue of whether E.G.'s constitutional rights were implicated by
this litigation, it construed these decisions as indicating the
Supreme Court's tendency to reject the age of1eighteen-as
a "bright
67
line" restricting minors' constitutional rights.
In accordance with its interpretation of the Illinois statutes relating to minors and United States Supreme Court precedent, the
court rejected chronological age as a bar to medical decisionmaking, and held that in Illinois, mature minors could exercise the
same common law right to control medical care as adults. 16 The
court then specifically extended to mature minors the common law
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, 69 holding that, had
E.G. been adjudged a mature minor, she indeed could have refused
the life-sustaining blood transfusions. 70
3.

Intervention of the Courts

Although the court recognized a mature minor's right to control
her own health care decisions, it determined that the exercise of
this right required judicial intervention.' 7 ' The court stated that,
unless the legislature provides otherwise, a trial judge must determine whether the minor is mature enough to make her own health
161. Id. at 108, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
162. Id (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) ("the right
to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as
adults")).
163. Id. (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (state cannot make absolute abortion prohibition for all minors under 15);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (state cannot make unconditional requirement of
parental consent for all minors seeking abortions)).
164. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (overturning lower court's dismissal of complaint against school officials
who had expelled students for wearing black armbands to school to protest Vietnam
War)).
165. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (public school officials
considered state actors for purposes of conducting searches and carrying out other disciplinary functions)).
166. Id. (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (minors in juvenile court proceedings
entitled to certain procedural due process guarantees)).
167. Id. at 108-09, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
168. Id. at 109, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 110, 549 N.E.2d at 327.
171. Id.
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care decisions.'M According to the court, two reasons justified judicial intervention: Illinois public policy, valuing the sanctity of
life, and the state's parens patriae
interest in protecting those un73
themselves.1
protect
to
able
Because both interests become critical when the minor's health
and life are at stake, the court concluded that the determination of
maturity required clear and convincing evidence:
If the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is mature
enough to appreciate the consequences of her actions, and that
the minor is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult,
then the mature minor doctrine affords her the74 common law
right to consent to or refuse medical treatment. 1
As in Longeway, however, the court cautioned that this right is
not absolute: it must be balanced against the state's interests in
preserving life, protecting the interests of third parties, preventing
suicide, and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. ' The court stated that in E.G.'s situation, protecting the
interests of third parties was the most significant of the four concerns.l7 6 For example, had E.G.'s mother opposed E.G.'s decision,
the mother's opposition would have
weighed heavily against E.G.'s
77
transfusions.
the
refuse
to
right
Finally, the court addressed the finding of neglect against E.G.'s
mother. The court reasoned that if the trial court had properly
declared E.G. a mature minor, it could not have found E.G.'s
mother guilty of neglect. 7 8 Because the trial court had lacked guidance on the ability of mature minors to refuse medical treatment,
the court remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Cook County
to expunge the neglect finding. 179
As a result of the court's decision in In re E.G., a mature minor
in Illinois may exercise the common law right to bodily self-deter172. Id.
173. Id. at 110-11, 549 N.E.2d at 327 (citing Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 51-52, 549
N.E.2d at 300-01).
174. Id. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 327-28. Although the court declared that mature
minors could exercise the right to control their medical care, the court did not comment
on the evidence offered in support of E.G.'s maturity. Furthermore, because E.G. had
reached the age of majority, the court declined to remand the case for a finding of maturity. Id. at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
175. Id. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328 (citing Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 48, 549 N.E.2d at
299).
176. Id. The court identified the principal third parties in the instant case as parents,
guardians, adult siblings, and other relatives. Id.
177. Id. at 111-12, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
178. Id. at 112-13, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
179. Id. at 113, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
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mination, including the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment. Thus, a minor who can demonstrate to a trial judge that she
is sufficiently mature to make her own health care decisions has the
right to refuse even lifesaving medical treatment. 181
4. The Dissents
Justice Ward, who issued a lengthy dissent in Longeway,'8 ' also
dissented in In re E.G.. According to Justice Ward, the majority's
position in E. G. was a dangerous departure from the state's parens
patriae duty to protect minors. 8 2 He distinguished E.G.'s case
from those merely involving a minor's consent to treatment because here, "a minor's injury or very self-destruction may be involved."'8 3 Justice Ward's dissent also criticized the majority for
departing from strict statutory construction, thereby eroding the
legislature's determination of the age of majority.8 4 Finally, Justice Ward criticized the majority for not articulating guidelines by
which the trial court will be required to make the determination of
maturity. 85
18 6
Justice Clark, who also issued a separate dissent in Longeway,
dissented in In re E.G. on mootness grounds. 87 Because E.G. had
turned eighteen, and because of the paucity of cases dealing with
the rights of mature minors to refuse lifesaving medical treatment,
Justice Clark stated that there was no need to provide an authorita-s
88
tive determination for the future guidance of public officials.
Justice Clark therefore concluded that the substantial public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not justify reaching the
merits of E.G.'s case. 8 9 Finding that none of the other exceptions
180. Id. at 110, 549 N.E.2d at 327.
181. Longeway, 133 Ill.
2d at 55, 549 N.E.2d at 302 (Ward, J., dissenting). Justice
Ward had difficulty with the majority's use of "substituted judgment," expressing the
concern that the surrogate will substitute the surrogate's own values for those of the
incompetent.
182. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 113, 549 N.E.2d at 328 (Ward, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 114, 549 N.E.2d at 329. Justice Ward found the distinction between allowing a minor to consent to beneficial treatment and allowing her to refuse lifesaving
treatment decisive, stating, "The safeguarding of health and the preservation of life are
obviously different conditions from one in which a minor will be held to have a common
law right ...to refuse medical treatment and sometimes in effect take his own life." Id.
at 113, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
184. Id. at 114, 549 N.E.2d at 329.
185. Id.
186. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 65, 549 N.E.2d at 307. (Clark, J., dissenting) (issue
should be decided by legislature)).
187. E.G., 133 I11.
2d at 115, 549 N.E.2d at 329 (Clark, J.,dissenting).
188. Id. at 115-16, 549 N.E.2d at 329-30.
189. Id. at 115, 549 N.E.2d at 330.
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to the mootness doctrine were applicable, Justice Clark concluded
that the issue presented was moot, and that the majority had erred
in addressing the merits.'"'

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re E.G. demonstrates
the difficulty of balancing the state's parenspatriaeinterest against
the rights of minors. It is commendable that the court recognized
that an individual does not undergo any magical transformation on
her eighteenth birthday whereby she is suddenly endowed with the
ability to make crucial decisions regarding her health. ' 9 ' The court
acknowledged that an individual well may reach a sufficient level
of maturity to make such decisions somewhat before the statutorily
defined age of majority. Although the majority's opinion may be
viewed by some as an abdication of the court's duty to protect
those who cannot protect themselves,' 9 2 the court's approach appropriately focuses less on the presumptions surrounding the age
of the individual and more on her ability to make a decision that is
both permitted by Illinois common law 93 and articulated in enactments of the Illinois legislature. 194
Application of the decision, however, undoubtedly will create
practical difficulties for health care providers and trial courts alike.
Health care providers will find the already thorny issue of informed consent becoming even more troublesome as the provider
attempts to determine from whom it is required to obtain consent.
Likewise, the trial court will encounter difficulties in determining
maturity; although the opinion in In re E.G. extended to the mature minor the right to control medical treatment, 195 it gives the
trier of fact no guidelines to follow in making the potentially critical determination of maturity.196
Finally, although the court advanced four state interests against
which the trial court must balance the minor's right to control her
treatment, 197 the same court noted in Longeway that none of the
190. Id. at 117-18, 549 N.E.2d at 330-31.
191. Id. at 106, 549 N.E.2d at 325.
192. See id. at 113, 549 N.E.2d at 328 (Ward, J., dissenting).
193. See In re Estate of Longeway, 133 111. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d at 292 (1989); In re
Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
194. See supra notes 63-64. (Living Will Act and Illinois Powers of Attorney for
Health Care Law discussed)
195. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 109, 549 N.E.2d at 326.
196. Id. at 114, 549 N.E.2d at 329 (Ward, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328. See supra note 175 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the state's interests.
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four interests normally would be sufficient to overcome the right of
an adult to control her own health care. 98 Because the right of the
mature minor to bodily self-determination purportedly is the same
as that of an adult, 99 none of these interests should be considered
sufficiently compelling to overcome the rights of the minor who
has been judged mature enough to make health care decisions
independently.
A.

Health Care Providers

The practical difficulties presented by E.G. will be encountered
first by health care providers. For example, E.G. first was brought
to the state's attention when her physicians reported her situation
to the Department of Children and Family Services, 200 as required
by the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. 20 1 Although
hospital personnel believed that E.G. had reached her decision in a
mature fashion, 20 2 because she was an unemancipated minor, her
refusal of the treatment legally was irrelevant. Because E.G.'s
mother was the sole party empowered to make health care decisions for E.G., the mother's refusal of lifesaving treatment automatically triggered the hospital's obligation to report E.G. as a
neglected minor.20 3
Even after the court's decision in In re E G., it remains irrelevant
to the health care provider whether the parent refuses to consent to
treatment for the minor, or whether the parent merely refuses to
override the minor's refusal of the treatment. So long as the minor
is unemancipated, the only relevant fact is that the parent is withholding consent for a medically necessary procedure, and the
health care provider still will be obligated to report the minor as
neglected,.
More problematic is the situation in which the minor herself re198. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 48, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
199. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 109, 549 N.E.2d at 326-27.
200. In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d 765, 766, 515 N.E.2d 286, 287 (1st Dist. 1987).
201. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 2051-2055 (1987). The Abused and Neglected
Child Reporting Act requires health care and other child care professionals to report
suspected cases of neglect to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services.
Id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04, discussing E.G.'s understanding of
her treatment options.
203. The Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act contains a mandatory requirement that a health care provider shall immediately report any suspected cases of abuse or
neglect. The Act leaves no room for the provider to exercise discretion once the minor
falls within the statutory definition of neglected. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054
(1987) (emphasis added).
204. Id.
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fuses treatment, despite the consent of the parent. A health care
provider that honors the wishes of the minor in such a situation
may run a substantial risk of incurring liability for medically abandoning the minor.20 5 On the other hand, although the consent of
the parent technically may be valid, a provider that compels an
apparently competent minor to accept treatment against her wishes
may now conceivably be liable to the minor for battery. 2 6 A prudent health care provider, however, has no statutory means of obtaining a declaration of its responsibilities because the parent's
consent precludes the institution of neglect proceedings. 20 7 Similarly, Illinois has no statute whereby a minor in E.G.'s position
may obtain an order allowing to her to consent to medical
treatment.
Although the court's failure to clarify the role of health care
providers will cause providers in these situations a certain amount
of confusion and difficulty, the provider is not without viable solutions to this dilemma. Furthermore, no amount of inconvenience
to the health care provider should outweigh the mature minor's
right to bodily autonomy.
One possible solution for the problems the health care provider
will encounter when a minor refuses necessary medical treatment
may lie in Section 11-5 of the Illinois Probate Act. 20 8 That section
provides that the court, upon the filing of a petition by any responsible citizen, may appoint a guardian of the person of the minor
whenever it appears necessary or convenient. 2°s This broad language could allow a physician or any other health care personnel
205. Although neither a physician nor a hospital has a duty to undertake to treat a
particular patient, once treatment is undertaken, the patient is owed a duty of reasonable
care. Compulsory Treatment, supra note 18, at 30. By failing to render necessary treatment to a legally incompetent patient, the health care provider could be liable to the
patient for abandonment. Id. at 30-31.
206. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. (right to bodily self-determination
discussed)
207. Although the Illinois Probate Act allows appointment of a guardian for persons
incompetent to make their own health care decisions, that portion of the Act pertains
only to adults. Under Section 1la-3, the court may appoint a guardian of the person if
the individual is disabled and "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible directions concerning the care of his person." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, para. 1 la-3 (1987). Section 1 la-2, however, defines a disabled person as "a
person 18 years or older who (a)because of mental deterioration or physical incapacity is
not fully able to manage his person or estate." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 1la-2
(1987). Under this Act, the hospital could request that the state appoint a guardian of
the person for an adult, but the language of the statute precludes application of this
portion of the Probate Act to a minor. Id
208. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 11-5 (1987).
209. Id.
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to petition the court for appointment of a guardian to consent to
treatment on a minor's behalf. 21' Once the matter is before the
trial court, the judge would have the opportunity to evaluate the
minor's maturity and either appoint a guardian or order the minor
emancipated for the purpose of consenting to medical treatment.
As previously stated, a minor seeking to control her own health
care decisions has no statutory means by which to petition the
court independently for an order of emancipation. The only Illinois statute allowing a minor to obtain such an order is the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act,211 which requires the minor to
verify that she has lived wholly or partially independent of her parents or guardian.21 2 Consequently, minors such as E.G. who remain part of a cohesive family unit cannot be emancipated under
the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act.
The Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, however, is not intended to be the only means of emancipation in Illinois. The Act
specifically provides that it does not exclude any other means
either in statutory or case law by which a minor may become
emancipated. 213 By requiring that a minor obtain a judicial deter-

mination of maturity,21 4 In re E.G. provides the minor access to
the courts of Illinois, and creates a case law means whereby a minor may seek an order of emancipation.
B.

Determination of Maturity

Once the minor seeking to be adjudged mature has gained access
to the judicial system, the problems presented by In re E.G. begin
anew. As Justice Ward notes in his dissent, the majority offers the
trier of fact no recommendations to guide its determination of maturity.21 5 Significantly, the court did not declare that E.G. was in
fact a mature minor,216 nor did it comment on the sufficiency of the
evidence presented regarding E.G.'s maturity. Unlike the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, which sets forth specific criteria re210. To date, however, the statute has been applied only to situations involving
guardianship when the parent-child relationship has been interrupted by divorce, death of
a parent, or parental unfitness. See, e.g., In re Lecocq's Estate, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 309
N.E.2d 84 (3d Dist. 1974).
211. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2201-2211 (1987). See supra note 126.
212. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2207 (1987). See supra note 126 for the partial
text of this provision.
213. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2202 (1987).
214. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 110, 549 N.E.2d at 327.
215. Id. at 114, 549 N.E.2d at 329 (Ward, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
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quired for a declaration of emancipation, 1 7 the opinion in E.G.
requires only that the trial court find clear and convincing evidence
of maturity.2 18
Furthermore, although E. G. is significant in that it allows a minor the opportunity to demonstrate the capacity to make vital
medical decisions, it is perhaps equally significant in that it does
not discard the presumption that minors lack the capacity to make
such decisions. 219 Because the trial court must find clear and convincing evidence of maturity, the minor's failure to meet that burden will allow the presumption of incapacity to stand.
As a practical matter, the requirement of clear and convincing
evidence effectively precludes a finding of maturity in an emergency or in any other situation where there is no opportunity for
the trial court judge to speak with the minor and evaluate her maturity firsthand. Likewise, where a judicial evaluation is impossible
because the minor is unconscious or incoherent, the court probably
will consider the minor's previously expressed desires regarding
health care insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence
of maturity.
Although the court made no attempt to set a minimum age for
application of the mature minor doctrine, the requirement of clear
and convincing evidence suggests that the younger the minor, the
less likely that she will be able to demonstrate the requisite maturity. Additionally, the trial court is not without legislative guidelines in this area. Under the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act,
220
a minor must be at least 16 to be ordered emancipated.
Although the Act provides that the presumption of legal incapacity
may be rebutted in the case of a minor 16 or older, it nevertheless
indicates a legislative intent to retain at least some presumption of
incapacity for minors under sixteen.22 1
217. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2207 (1987).
218. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 327-28. Even in cases when emancipation
is sought through channels other than the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, Illinois
courts appear to focus on the minor's demonstrated ability to live independently of her
parents and manage her own financial affairs. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Donahoe, 114
Ill. App. 3d 470, 448 N.E.2d 1030 (2d Dist. 1983).
219. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 110-11, 549 N.E.2d at 327-28. The court stated "A minor
may have a long and fruitful life ahead that an immature, foolish decision could jeopardize. Consequently, when the trial judge weighs the evidence in making a determination of
whether a minor is mature enough to handle a health care decision, he must find proof of
this maturity by clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 110, 549 N.E.2d at 327.
220. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2203-2 (1987).
221. The stated purpose of the Act is to provide a means of obtaining legal emancipation for minors who can demonstrate the ability to manage their own affairs. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 2201 (1987). By requiring that the minor be at least 16, however, the
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In contrast, the Consent by Minors to Medical Operations Act
allows a minor who is age twelve or older to consent to treatment
for venereal disease or substance abuse.222 Rather than indicating
a legislative determination that minors twelve and older have the
capacity to make well-reasoned decisions about medical care, this
Act represents a legislative recognition of the importance of allowing access to these services to any minor with even minimal
capacity to consent to treatment. 223 As such, the Act furthers the
state's interest in preserving the minor's life and health. It appears,
therefore, that in the absence of any similar overriding social policy, the legislature has adopted a presumption of incapacity for minors under sixteen, and a trial court accordingly should exercise
extreme reluctance to allow such minors to make life-threatening
medical decisions.
C. Balancing the Competing Interests
Although the court did not provide guidelines for the determination of maturity, it identified four state interests that the trial court
should balance against the right of the mature minor to refuse lifesaving treatment. 224 As in Longeway, the four competing interests
articulated in In re E.G. were the state's interest in preserving life,
the interests of third parties, the interest of the state in preventing
suicide, and the interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical
profession. 22 5' Even though these interests have been recognized as
important by a number of courts and commentators, 26 none are
sufficiently weighty to override the mature minor's right to control
her own health care.
1. The state's interest in preserving life
The state's interest in preserving life long has been recognized as
a valid exercise of its police power, and frequently is considered to
be part of its parens patriae power as well. As the court in E.G.
states, the interest of the state in preserving a minor's life is strongest when the minor is immature and the health care issues are polegislature apparently has determined that minors under 16 still are in need of a certain
amount of parental protection and guidance.
222. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4504 (1987).
223. See supra notes 147-49. (discussing statutory provisions)
224. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
225. Id.
226. For a discussion of the competing interests and the manner in which the states
have dealt with them, see generally Compulsory Treatment, supra note 18.
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tentially life-threatening.227 As a practical matter, the younger the
minor, the more likely that the minor will in fact be immature.
Consequently, the younger the minor, the stronger the state's interest in preserving the minor's life, and the less likely that a court
will allow the minor to make life-threatening decisions.
Although the adoption of a balancing test suggests that at some
point the state's interest in the preservation of life may outweigh
the mature minor's right to medical autonomy, the decision in E. G.
belies this conclusion. As stated previously, the state's interest is
strongest when the minor's condition is life-threatening. The
court's willingness to allow E.G. to make a life-threatening decision, however, indicates that it is the maturity of the minor, and
not the consequences of the minor's decision, that should be considered determinative; therefore, even when the state's interest in
preserving life is at its strongest, it is not sufficiently compelling to
outweigh the mature minor's right to medical autonomy.
2.

The interests of third parties

Of the four competing interests mentioned by the court in In re
E. G., the interests of third parties were identified as the most important.2 28 The court indicated that when the decision of the minor is contrary to the wishes of her parent, the trial court should
give great consideration to the parent's wishes. 229 Again, the adoption of a balancing test indicates that at some point, the wishes of
the parent could prove sufficiently compelling to defeat the right of
the minor to refuse treatment.
In Longeway, however, the court indicated that the interests of
third parties normally would not be sufficiently compelling to outweigh the individual's right to bodily autonomy. 230 Because the
court in E. G. claims that the right of the mature minor to autonomy in medical decision-making is equal to that of an adult, the
rights of the minor should not be overcome by any interest that
could not outweigh the rights of an adult in a similar situation.
Consequently, if the interests of third parties are insufficient to
overcome the rights of an adult, they are insufficient to overcome
the rights of a mature minor.
Most courts that have considered the constitutional issues involved in the right to refuse medical treatment have based their
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 111-12, 549 N.E.2d at 229.
Id. at 111-12, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
Id.
Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 48, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
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decisions both on the right to privacy and the common law right to
informed consent. 231 In its decision in Cruzan, the United States
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he principle that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.''232 The constitutional right to privacy inherent in medical
decisionmaking,233 requires that any state restriction on a minor's
right to such autonomy must pass muster under the standards set
234 and Bellotti.
235 Allowing the parforth in Planned Parenthood
ents' wishes to overcome the mature minor's constitutional right to
refuse medical treatment could result in precisely the type of absolute veto power held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood and
Bellotti.
3. Interest of the State in Preventing Suicide
The third state interest articulated in In re E.G. was the prevention of suicide.236 Although the state has a legitimate interest in
preventing suicide, that interest is not implicated in cases such as
In re E.G. Because suicide involves the deliberate termination of
one's existence,237 it requires both that one desires to die and that
one set in motion the causative factors of death. 238 According to
her own testimony, E.G. did not wish to die, but her religion forbade her to accept blood transfusions. 239 By following her religious
beliefs, E.G. was not actively seeking death, but was merely refusing a form of treatment that was unacceptable to her.
Furthermore, because E.G. suffered from leukemia, a condition
that was not self-induced, her circumstances did not meet the legal
231. See e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990).
For further discussion of Cruzan, see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
232. Id. at 2851. Parenthetically, on the same day the Court decided Cruzan, the
Court rendered a decision in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990). Writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens held that the two-parent parental notification requirement of
the Minnesota abortion statute was unconstitutional. Citing Bellotti and Planned
Parenthood,the Court reiterated that a parent's interest in the termination of the pregnancy of a competent and mature minor is not outweighed by the minor's privacy interest. Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. at 2946.
233. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. (discussing the state's ability to
restrict a minor's right to an abortion)
235. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
236. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
237. Best Interests, supra note 43, at 549.
238. Id.
239. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 103, 549 N.E.2d at 324.
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definition of suicide. 240 The state's interest in preventing suicide in
such cases is adequately served by ascertaining that the minor has
not purposely induced her fatal condition out of a desire to die; it
should not therefore be grounds for defeating the mature minor's
right to exercise autonomy in medical decision-making.241
4.

Maintaining the integrity of the medical profession

The final state interest articulated in In re E.G. was maintaining
the integrity of the medical profession. 42 Certainly there can be
few situations more devastating and demoralizing to a medical professional than to be compelled to watch a patient die from a condition that could be remedied by a relatively simple medical
procedure. The doctrine of informed consent underlying all medical decisions, however, would be meaningless if it could be defeated
in order to maintain the integrity of the medical profession.2 43 The
trial court adequately can protect the interests of the medical profession by not requiring health care workers to perform procedures
against the dictates of their consciences. 2 " As wrenching as the
medical dilemma must be, it cannot be considered a substantive
reason for denying the patient her right to choose.245
V.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re E. G. undoubtedly
will provoke voluminous commentary and debate among practitioners, clergy, academics, the judiciary, and the numerous special
interest groups whose beliefs are involved. Much of the commentary will be, at best, negative. However, the Illinois Supreme
Court should be commended for attempting to grapple with the
seemingly insurmountable issues, and for formulating a morally acceptable solution. Although the Supreme Court's approach raises
240. Best Interests, supra note 43, at 549. The authors contend that so long as the
fatal medical condition is not self-induced, refusing life-sustaining medical treatment does
not fall within the legal definition of suicide. Id.
241. Pointing out the distinction between self-destruction and self-determination, the
authors state that there is an "emerging judicial consensus that the terminally ill patient's
prerogative to shape medical intervention will be deemed to be outside the legal realm of
suicide." Id
242. E.G., 133 Ill. 2d at 111, 549 N.E.2d at 328.
243. Compulsory Treatment, supra note 18, at 31.
244. Id. For example, a surgeon should not be required to perform a procedure that
will be made unreasonably dangerous by the patient's refusal of blood transfusions. Id.
The E.G. court stated that "[i]t must be evident that neither a court nor a patient can
dictate treatment contrary to reasonable and good faith medical judgment." Id.
245. Id.
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a number of practical difficulties, by affording a minor the opportunity to demonstrate the maturity to manage her own health care, it
allows autonomy to those with the capacity to exercise it, while
still protecting those unable to protect themselves.
JENNIFER FOUTS SKEELS

